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NOTES

should be required to have before it some other. information
about the prisoner so as not to give undue importance to any
one factor through failure to consider others. To require this
should impose no additional burden on the board since its
regulations already require as much.
Peter Wilbert Arbour
LOCAL RULE ENFORCEMENT BY STATE DISTRICT COURTS

Plaintiffs in a wrongful death action were duly notified of
a pre-trial conference scheduled by the trial judge pursuant to
article 15511 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When plaintiffs'
counsel failed to appear, the district court, on its own motion
and in accordance with the local rules, entered a dismissal without prejudice. The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held,
the local rule which provided the sanction of dismissal for the
failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial conference was
invalid as a violation of Code of Civil Procedure article
1672.2 Boudreaux v. Yancey, 256 So.2d 340 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971).
Article 1551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, empowering the
trial judge to order a pre-trial conference, enables the court to
fashion in advance the course of a trial. Through this procedure
it is intended that the parties, the witnesses, and the court will
save time, effort, expense, and inconvenience. Article 1551, however, does not specify what sanctions, if any, may be imposed
for the failure of a party to comply with the order.
Article 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure 8 gives state dis1. "In any civil action in a district court the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference ....
"The court shall render an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matter considered, and which limits
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel. Such order controls the subsequent course of the action, unless
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice."
2. "A judgment dismissing an action shall be rendered upon application
of any party, when the plaintiff fails to appear on the day set for trial.
In such case the court shall determine whether the judgment of dismissal
shall be with or without prejudice."
3. "A court may adopt rules for the conduct of judicial business before
it, Including those governing matters of practice and procedure which are
not contrary to the rules provided by law .... " LA. CoNsT. art. IV § 4

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

trict courts a general power to adopt rules to insure the orderly
conduct of judicial business, and it is well settled that local
rules bind both the judge and the litigants. 4 Court rules are,
however, subordinate to legislative enactments, and will be
stricken if a conflict arises. 5 In a recent First Circuit case, Caston
v. Woman's Hospital Foundation,Inc.,0 a third party intervenor's
attorney failed to comply with pre-trial orders and then failed
to appear at the pre-trial conference due to an unexplained
emergency. The trial court refused to dismiss the intervenor's
claim, holding that dismissal was not the proper sanction under
the circumstances. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that there
had been no abuse of the court's discretion, thereby implying
a power of dismissal in the trial court.7 In an older case, Walker
v. Ducros,8 decided in 1866, the use of the sanction of dismissal
was upheld, even though the rule requiring appearance was a
court rule, and not a legislative enactment. It should be noted
that in Walker the sanction was upheld, not for the failure of a
party to appear at trial, but for failure to appear at a time
prior to trial.9
provides, in part: "The Legislature shall not pass any local or special law
on the following specified subject: . . . Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of any court, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts .... "
4. Interdiction of Wenger, 147 La. 422, 85 So. 62 (1920).
5. See LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 193.
6. 243 So.2d 872 (La. App. 1st Mr. 1971).
7. The court stated that "[tihe rules are intended to aid the orderly
conduct of litigation and should not be so literally construed as to defeat
their very purpose. To this end the trial judge must of necessity be vested
with the discretion to ascertain whether or not the proposed violation Is
such as to warrant dismissal." Id. at 874.
8. 18 La. Ann. 703 (1866). It was there stated that court rules "ought
not to be relaxed or suspended to meet temporary convenience or to be
accommodated to the ever varying circumstances of time." Id. at 704. In
this case, both parties failed to appear on the first day of the court term,
on which day all cases were to be set for trial, in accordance with a local
rule. See, also Neal v. Hall, 28 So.2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
Although not specifically stated in the court's opinion, the district
court's authority was based on Code of Practice article 145 (1861). This
article stated: "The courts are authorized to enact, respectively, rules
establishing the mode of proceeding before them, in all cases not provided by this code, provided the same be not contrary to the rules here
prescribed." The substance of this article is very similar to that of the
first sentence of article 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. In Walker, both the rule requiring the parties' appearance and the
rule imposing dismissal were based on the court's inherent power, as distinguished from Boudreaux, In which the order requiring appearance was
based on a statutory expression, namely Code of Civil Procedure article
1551. If the penalty of dismissal Is upheld as a proper sanction for the
violation of a local rule, a fortiori, when a statutory enactment Is violated,
it should be a proper sanction.

NOTES
In the instant case, the First Circuit observed that no provision of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically sanctions the
penalty of dismissal for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. The court stated that the sanction of dismissal is not
within the inherent power of the court, and held that this sanction exceeds a legislative enactment, article 1672, which is the
only legislative expression authorizing dismissal as a sanction
for the failure of a party to appear.
In Rayborn v. Rayborn,'0 relied on in Boudreaux, the local
rule had the effect of requiring a response to summary proceeding, in violation of article 2593,11 which provides that an
answer is not required to a petition in a summary proceeding.
As a sanction, the party in violation of the rule was precluded
from presenting evidence concerning the subject of the answer
he was to file. The court held that the local rule was in opposition to a legislative enactment and therefore void.1 2 It is not
doubted that Rayborn and the cases cited therein are correct,
but these cases do not answer the question presented by Boudreaux, that is, may a sanction which does not contravene any
express legislative enactment be struck down?
A strong statutory argument may be made, based on article
191 and article 193, that the power of dismissal is not limited
to the situation which article 1672 controls. Article 1672 states
that "a judgment dismissing an action shall be rendered . . .
when the plaintiff fails to appear on the day set for trial." It is
arguable that this is the only situation in which there is no
discretion in the court, the dismissal being mandatory. This
position is reinforced by article 191 which grants the court "all
10. 246 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
11. "Exceptions to a contradictory motion, rule to show cause, opposi-

tion, or petition in a summary proceeding shall be filed prior to 'the time
assigned for, and shall be disposed of on, the trial. An answer is
required, except as otherwise provided by law."
12. In addition to being prevented from Introducing evidence,

not
the

offending party was also denied the right to cross-examine. The court
stated that these penalties constituted a denial of due process. In holding
the rule invalid, the court also relied on Trahan v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 250

La. 949, 200 So.2d 6 (1967), where the same basic problem existed; a conflict
between a local rule and legislation, LA. R.S. 23:1315 (1950). The court
indicated that the statute would prevail, although the issue was not before
the court since the rules were not offered in evidence. The Rayborn decision
also relies upon Sciortino v. Sciortino, 250 La. 727, 198 So.2d 905 (1967), but
this case stands only for the propositions that local rules have the effect
of law on the judges and litigants and the rules must be placed in evidence
for the appellate court to recognize them.
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the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction."'I s In
view of past reluctance of the appellate courts to interfere with
this power,'14 it is possible that article 1672 could be interpreted
as an exception to the discretionary right of the court to dismiss rather than an exclusive situation in which the district
court is given the power to dismiss. 5

In Boudreaux, the court also reasoned that article 1672 is
the only statute which permits dismissal for the failure of a
party to appear. However, the case of Walker v. Ducros'6 stands
as general authority for the use of dismissal for failure to obey
court rules. May Walker be distinguished by saying that it was
decided under the Code of Practice of 1825? It seems not, since
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was intended to remove
many of the restrictions which had been placed on trial judges
by the Code of Practice, by granting them more power, authority, and discretion.' It may strongly be contended, therefore,
that the inherent power of dismissal should be recognized under
the more liberal Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
The court, in its reasoning, failed to mention or distinguish
Caston v. Woman's Hospital Foundation, Inc.' s The First Circuit
in Caston stated that "the trial judge must of necessity be
13. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 191. (Emphasis added.)
14. In Green v. Dakin a Dakin, 15 La. 152, 154 (1840), the court stated:
"We have not the power, and still less the inclination, to interfere with
the police and regulations of the inferior courts, unless they be manifestly
contrary to law and lead to gross injustice . .. ."
15. The argument may also be made that failure to attend the pre-trial
conference is evidence of failure to prosecute and dismissal would be an
appropriate sanction. In Lewis v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters,
Inc., 233 So.2d 743 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), the court held that article 1672
required the party to prosecute his case on the day set for trial, rather than
merely appearing. After recognizing the power of the court to dismiss
for failure to prosecute, one need only define "failure to prosecute" to
include failure to attend the pre-trial conference to say that the court
possesses the power to dismiss for failure to attend the pre-trial conference. But of. Levy v. Stelly, 230 So.2d 774 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
This interpretation necessarily means that the court does not inherently
possess the power of a dismissal, but rather that it is vested with the power
under a legislative enactment. This could be troublesome when other
violations of local rules occur which could not be interpreted as failure
to prosecute. Code of Civil Procedure article 1672 also contains the language "on the day set for trial," and such an interpretation would read
this phrase out of the statute when non-appearance at a pre-trial conference
is involved.
16. 18 La. Ann. 703 (1866).
17. McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. Rsv. 1
(1960).
18. 248 So.2d 872 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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vested with the discretion to ascertain whether or not the proposed violation is such as to warrant the maximum penalty-of
dismissal."'19 The appellate court's opinion was premised on the
trial court's possession of the power of dismissal, the only issue
being the proper exercise of discretion. It will be noted that in
Caston the failure to attend the pre-trial conference was aggravated by the failure of the attorney to attend the personal conference of the attorneys, as prescribed by the pre-trial procedure.
This does not seem to be such a difference as would change the
sanction if the party failed only to attend the pre-trial conference.
The decision in Boudreaux leaves serious problems since
the authorities used do not aid the district courts in formulating
sanctions for disobedience of local rules. Neither does the statement by the court, that the sanction must not violate a principle
of substantive law, give the courts any distinct or practical
guidelines.20
19. Id. at 874.
20. Since article 1551 is similar to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is helpful to look to the federal law and practice in similar
situations. See McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civ4g Procedure, 21 LA. L.
REV. 1 (1960). The general rule making power of the federal district courts
is granted by rule 83. The power of dismissal is given by rule 43, which
allows dismissal for the failure of plaintiff to comply with any order of
court. This rule is the only significant difference between the federal and
state authority for the imposition of -the sanction of dismissal for the
failure of a party to obey court orders or rules, there being nothing comparable to 41(b) in Louisiana procedure. The dismissal under rule 41, unless
otherwise stated, is a dismissal with prejudice, as contrasted with article
1672 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the
judge must make a determination of whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. The leading federal case is Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626 (1962), in which there was a delay of approximately five years from the
filing of the suit until the calling of the pre-trial conference by the trial
court. When plaintiff's counsel failed to attend, the trial court dismissed
for "failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear at the pretrial, for failure
to prosecute this action." Id. at 629. The Supreme Court affirmed, but did
not decide if the failure to attend the pre-trial conference, by itself, would
have justified dismissal. Due to the Court's statement concerning the scope
of the decision, federal courts have consistently rested their decisions
upholding a dismissal on grounds other than solely a failure to attend the
pre-trial conference. See Hyler v. Reynolds Metal Co., 434 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1970); Provenza v. H. & W. Wrecking Co., 424 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1970);
Wisdom v. Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ala. 1939). The federal courts
have not evidenced a similar attitude toward violation of other court rules
or orders, and FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b) does not require it as to pre-trial conferences. See Marshall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 353 F.2d 737 (5th
Cir. 1965); Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1964);
In re Societa Italiana De Armamento, 210 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. La. 1962). An
indication of change has recently been shown by the Fifth Circuit in
McGrady v. D'Andrea Elec., Inc., 434 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1970), in which
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What sanctions are available to the trial court? The only
sanction given by the legislature is contempt of court. Continuance of conference with a penalty against the offending party,
as to the evidence presented at the pre-trial conference, or a
direct fine, might also be suggested, their bases being the inherent power of the court. With respect to contempt, article
224(2) provides that the willful disobedience of any lawful
judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court will constitute a constructive contempt.2 1 But when a party is held in
contempt he may apply for supervisory writs, and while these
writs are pending no further action is taken in the case. This
procedure, in the overall picture, defeats the purpose of pretrial, which is to reduce the docket overload, and save the court
and the parties time and inconvenience. 22 The same result is
likely to be reached if the attorney is held in contempt.
Next, under the court's inherent power, an exclusionary
sanction with respect to certain evidence is a possible penalty.
Since dismissal is totally ineffective against a defendant, the
exclusionary penalty would be an appropriate sanction against
him. The harshness of this sanction is readily seen in Rayborn,
and it appears to the writer that an exclusionary sanction against
a defendant is a much more severe penalty than is a dismissal
without prejudice against a plaintiff. This type penalty is very
questionable, however, in the light of Rayborn's statement that
the sanction in that case was a denial of due process28 Closely
related to this would be a sanction which acted to transfer
the burden of proof to the offending party, with respect to certain issues. However, the problem of court administration could
render the enforcement of this penalty difficult, and considering the extensive use of discovery and the information that
the court stated that the failure of a party to attend the pre-trial conference, by itself, was sufficient to warrant a dismissal under the inherent
power of the court to enforce its rules. The court cited Flaska V. Little
River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968), although in Flaska
the statements were dicta, since the court held the sanction of dismissal
too harsh under the circumstances.
21. See also LA. CODE Cv. P. art. 224(4) which provides that: "Deceit or
abuse of the process or procedure of the court by a party to an action or
proceeding, or by his attorney," will also constitute contempt.
22. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1551, Foreword on Proposed Pre-trial Statute:
"The other immediate benefits of pre-trial may be said to include the following: . . . (4) The saving of much time, effort, expense and inconvenience,
not only for the parties and the court, but also for the witnesses."
23. The court stated therein, in dicta, that the denial of the right to
cross-examine and to present evidence deprived defendant of due process.
Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So.2d 400, 404-05 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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may be gained thereby, it is possible that the penalty would not
act as an effective deterrent. A direct fine against the party or
the attorney might be suggested. However, in Gamble v. Pope
& Talbert, Inc.,24 a federal case, it was held that a fine, independent of the contempt statute, was not within the inherent power
of the court. The same line of reasoning could be applicable to
a state law situation, especially in view of the restrictive attitude
taken with respect to the inherent power of the trial court, as
evidenced by Boudreaux.
It is unsatisfactory to say, as did the First Circuit, that
the absence of the sanction of dismissal in article 193 and article
1551 precludes its use. If it is necessary that the sanctions be
listed, then the trial court is powerless to enforce its order for
a pre-trial conference (because as the court stated, no penalties
are set out in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure). Certainly
it is an undesirable situation, and it is unlikely that the legislators intended to leave the court without the power to enforce
article 1551.
It is quite possible that the situation in Boudreaux was not
appropriate for dismissal, but the court did not limit itself to
such a narrow position. 25 However, it is possible to envision such
a gross abuse as would deserve dismissal. The ideal solution
would be the enactment of a statute, which conclusively states
that the district courts possess the power of dismissal as a sanction for the violation of local court rules. In the absence of a
statute, it is submitted that there be judicial reconsideration of
the problem, and a determination that the power of dismissal is
present in the district court. This result could be secured if
the implications of Caston were followed. The writer suggests
that dismissal may be the only sanction which is both effective
in commanding respect for local rules, and in carrying out the
overall purpose of pre-trial procedure.
Edwin Dunahoe
24. 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962). Defendant's attorney failed to file pretrial memorandum on time, in violation of a court rule. The court could
have Invoked the contempt statute, FED. R. Civ. P. 42, and fined defendant's
attorney under it. But see Flaska v. Little Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885
(5th Cir. 1968).
25. "We are forced to conclude that the penalty of dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference is not sanctioned by either C.C.P. Article 193 which permits the adoption of court
rules or C.C.P. Article 1551 which statutorily outlines pre-trial procedure."
256 So.2d at 342. The court also stated that the penalty of dismissal went
beyond a principle of substantive law.

